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Justifiable Limitations on Title VII
Anti-Retaliation Provisions
Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 E3d 1181 (llth Cir. 1997).
Title VII prohibits not only discrimination, but also retaliation against
employees who complain about discriminatory practices. The anti-retaliation
provision extends protection both to employees who have "opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice" under Title VII (the
"opposition clause") and to employees who have "made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under" Title VII (the "participation clause").' The importance of
defending employees against retaliation for invoking statutory protection is
clear: Without such protection, employees would be dissuaded from pressing
their claims in the first place.2 In Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co.,3 however, a
panel of the Eleventh Circuit extended this protection too far, reading the
scope of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision so broadly as to cover harassers
who participate in proceedings brought on account of their own unlawful
behavior.
Existing Title VII jurisprudence did not mandate this result. The Merritt
court should have paid more explicit attention to the purposes of Title VII
when interpreting the language of section 704(a). In addition, the court should
have balanced employer and employee interests in determining whether or not
to shield the employee from retaliation, as courts have done in the opposition
clause context. Either way, by denying harassers the protection of section
704(a), the court would have contributed to employer efforts to create work
environments free from harassment and discrimination.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
2. See Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714. 726 (5th Cir. 1986); Douglas E. Ray, Thie V11 Retaliation
Cases: Creating a New Protected Class, 58 U. Prrr. L. REv. 405, 406 (1997).
3. 120 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 1997).
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Janet Moore, a receptionist at Dillard Paper Company, initiated a lawsuit
under Title VII alleging sexual harassment by several men in her office,
including Harry Merritt. During his deposition, Merritt reluctantly admitted to
conduct that plainly constituted harassment.4 Dillard subsequently settled
Moore's case. The company president then reviewed the deposition testimony
and decided on this basis to terminate Merritt, who in turn filed his own Title
VII suit, alleging unlawful retaliation. The district court granted summary
judgment for the employer, ruling that Title VII "does not protect those who
participate in another's case involuntarily and without any intent or desire to
assist.' 5
The Eleventh Circuit reversed. In the panel's view, the participation clause
of section 704(a) extends protection by its own terms even to those whose
participation is neither voluntary nor intended to aid the complainant.6 The
panel refused to read the provision through the lens of clear statutory purposes,
as the lower court had done,7 and defended its literal interpretation by
distinguishing the relevance of limits imposed in opposition clause cases.8
II
The court's interpretation of section 704(a) is in some tension with
Supreme Court precedent and the general practice of the federal judiciary in
retaliation cases. The panel applied a well-supported canon of statutory
construction: "'[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what
it means and means in a statute what it says there."' 9 And it concluded that
the language of the retaliation provision clearly and unambiguously included
the plaintiff." Surprisingly, however, the panel failed even to mention
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.," a recent decision in which the Supreme Court
interpreted the retaliation provision at issue in Merritt. A unanimous Court
determined that the term "employees" as used in section 704(a) includes
former employees," even though a literal reading of the statute would not
support this result. The Court applied the same canon as the Merritt court, but
emphasized that clarity in meaning cannot be determined merely by
4. See id. at 1184 ("Despite Merritt's lack of candor and reluctance, Moore's attorney... succecd[cd]
in extracting from Merritt deposition testimony useful to Moore in proving her Title VII claim.").
5. Id. (discussing the district court's unpublished opinion).
6. See id. at 1185.
7. See id. at 1186.
8. See id. at 1186-87.
9. Id. at 1185 (quoting Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)).
10. See id. at 1186 (articulating the literal meaning of the word "testified" and the phrase "participated
in any manner").
11. 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997).
12. See id. at 849.
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considering words alone: "The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is
determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which
that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole."'
13
Finding ambiguity, the Court resolved this lack of clarity in a fashion "more
consistent with the broader context of Title VII and the primary purpose of §
704(a)" than a literal reading.' 4
If the Eleventh Circuit had applied Robinson, it could not have relied as
it did on literal interpretation divorced from context. Just as the word
"employee" is subject to interpretation, it is far from clear that the phrase
"participated in any manner" necessarily includes the testimony of an
individual who is not attempting to assist the complainant, much less that of
the person responsible for the alleged Title VII violation in the first place.
Indeed, the clear purpose of section 704(a) is to protect employees who utilize
the tools provided by Congress to assert their rights.' 5 Under Robinson,
therefore, it is reasonable to deny protection to those whose participation was
not intended to vindicate those rights.'
6
III
Even though the Merritt court adopted a literal interpretation, thereby
including Merritt within the scope of the anti-retaliation provision, it should
have acknowledged that the protection for participation is not limitless.
Although those who participate in Title VII proceedings generally enjoy more
13. Id at 846.
14. Id at 849. The Court has refused to allow too-literal readings of provisions to defeat underlying
statutory purposes in other contexts as well. See. e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586
(1983) (stating, in interpreting the tax laws, that "[i]t is a well-established canon of statutory construction
that a court should go beyond the literal language of a statute if reliance on that language would defeat the
plain purpose of the statute"); Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183. 194 (1856) (stating. in
interpreting the patent laws, that "it is well settled that, in interpreting a statute, the court will not look
merely to a particular clause .... but will take in connection with it the whole statute ... and the objects
and policy of the law ... and give to it such a construction as will carry into execution the will of the
Legislature").
Lower courts interpreting the participation clause have likewise emphasized the need to be guided by
statutory purpose, not narrow textual construction. See, e.g., McDonnell v. Cisneros. 84 F.3d 256. 262 (7th
Cir. 1996) (interpreting the retaliation provision "liberally" in order "to accomplish its evident purpose" of
protecting "complainants and witnesses"); EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541. 545 (6th Cir. 1993)
(noting that "courts have routinely adopted interpretations of retaliation provisions ... that might be viewed
as outside the literal terms of the statute in order to effectuate Congress's clear purpose in proscribing
retaliatory activity"); Almendarez v. Barrett-Fisher Co., 762 F.2d 1275, 1278 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Lliteral
statutory construction is inappropriate if it would produce a result in conflict with the legislative purpose
clearly manifested in an entire statute .... ).
15. See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 848 (describing the maintenance of "unfettered access to statutory
remedial mechanisms" as "a primary purpose of antiretaliation provisions"): Pettaway v. American Cast
Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1004-05 (5th Cir. 1969) ("There can be no doubt about the purpose of
§ 704(a). In unmistakable language it is to protect the employee who utilizes the tools provided by
Congress to protect his rights.").
16. It might be argued that the purpose of the clause is to encourage truthful testimony, even by the
perpetrators of unlawful conduct. See Merritt, 120 F.3d at 1184. But such honesty can be promoted through
alternative means-such as laws against peijury-that do not immunize the wrongdoer from punishment.
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protection than those who merely oppose activities made unlawful by Title
VII,17 courts have imposed some restrictions on participation and would be
justified in going further-namely, by incorporating the balancing test
developed in opposition clause cases-to ensure that the purposes of Title VII
are not frustrated. In this way, standards developed in both the participation
and opposition contexts could easily have been applied to exclude Merritt from
coverage.
In opposition clause cases, courts have explicitly embraced a balancing
test.' 8 To determine whether an employee's activities are protected, courts
balance the plaintiff's interest in vindicating her Title VII rights with the
employer's interest in taking the adverse employment action.'9 Under this
test, employee opposition generally loses statutory protection if it is too
damaging to the employer's business goals, 20 if it is excessively disruptive of
workplace affairs (including the job performance of the employee and her
coworkers), 2' or if it is unreasonable under the circumstances. 22
Strictly speaking, participation clause cases are not subject to the same sort
of balancing. Employees are protected without question when they themselves
invoke the processes established by law for the resolution of equal employment
disputes.23 And courts do not limit coverage merely to complainants: The
participation clause also shelters from retaliation other employees who
participate in various ways in their coworkers' claims.
24
17. See Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989) ("[F]deml
courts have generally granted less protection for opposition than for participation in enforcement
proceedings."); Croushorn v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Tenn., 518 F Supp. 9, 21 (M.D. Tenn. 1980)
("While the 'participation' clause covers a narrower range of activities than the other, it gives those
activities stronger protection than the 'opposition' clause provides."); Ray, supra note 2, at 409-10 ("Courts
have interpreted the participation clause as providing nearly absolute protection .... Protection under the
opposition clause, by contrast, has limits.").
18. See R. Bales, A New Standard for 7Ttle VII Opposition Cases: Fitting the Personnel Manager
Double Standard into a Cognizable Framework, 35 S. TEX. L. REv. 95, 112-17 (1994); Elizabeth
Chambliss, Tile VII as a Displacement of Conflict, 6 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1997).
19. See, e.g., Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 233 (1st Cir.
1976) ("[Ihe employer's right to run his business must be balanced against the rights of the employee to
express his grievances and promote his own welfare."); see also Silver v. KCA. Inc., 586 F.2d 138, 141
(9th Cir. 1978) ("Mhe means of opposition chosen must be ... reasonable in view of the employer's
interest in maintaining a harmonious and efficient operation.").
20. See, e.g., Mozee v. Jeffboat, Inc., 746 F.2d 365, 373-74 (7th Cir. 1984); Wrighten v. Metropolitan
Hosps., Inc., 726 F.2d 1346, 1355-56 (9th Cir. 1984); Hochstadt, 545 F.2d at 233.
21. See, e.g., EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 1983); Rosser v.
Laborers' Int'l Union, Local No. 438, 616 F2d 221, 223-24 (5th Cir. 1980).
22. See, e.g., O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 763-64 (9th Cir. 1994);
Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1036-37 (5th Cir. 1980).
23. See Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978).
24. See, e.g., Smith v. Georgia, 749 F.2d 683, 684 (1 lth Cir. 1985) (protecting an employee who had
testified on behalf of a coworker in the latter's discrimination action against the employer); Van Richardson
v. Burrows, 885 F. Supp. 1017, 1023 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (protecting an employee who had filed an affidavit
in support of another employee's discrimination claim); Smith v. Columbus Metro. Hous. Auth., 443 F.
Supp. 61, 64 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (protecting an employee who had refused to assist the employer in preparing
its defense against another employee's claim of discrimination); see also Bales, supra note 18, at 104-05
("An employee is protected if the employee encourages co-workers to enforce their Title VII rights, refuses
to sign an inaccurate affidavit on behalf of an employer, testifies on behalf of a co-worker, . . . participates
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Nevertheless, courts have excluded certain activities from protection under
the participation clause-sometimes explicitly,25 sometimes implicitly. In
cases like Merritt, involving plaintiffs who have not filed charges themselves,
protection has been extended only to those who help coworkers vindicate their
own discrimination charges.' More fundamentally, although courts officially
employ a balancing test only in the opposition clause context,27  such
considerations are clearly relevant-and often emerge-in participation cases
as well. Where participation itself disrupts business affairs, for example, the
employee's interest in vindicating her rights may be outweighed by the
employer's interest in a well-functioning and productive workplace.2
Participation conduct may also be subjected to a balancing test when it
interferes directly with the employee's own job performance-because the
employee spends too much work time pursuing the complaint,' because she
fails to fulfill job duties,30 or because the very filing of a complaint impedes
in a conciliation meeting on behalf of a co-worker, (or] submits affidavits on behalf of a co-worker to the
EEOC ....").
25. Due to the terms of the anti-retaliation provision, neither participation in internal investigations.
see Vasconcelos v. Meese, 907 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1990); Moms v. Boston Edison Co.. 942 F Supp.
65,71 (D. Mass. 1996), nor participation in proceedings involving charges of discnmination not prohibited
by Title VII, see Learned v. Bellevue, 860 F.2d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1988), enjoys statutory protection.
26. See, e.g., Pagano v. Frank, 815 F. Supp. 30. 31 (D. Mass. 1992) ('Plaintiff did not oppose any
unlawful employment practice; plaintiff allegedly engaged in an unlawful employment practice. Plaintiff's
claim that he is entitled to Title VII protection for his 'participation* in an investigation. .seems of
doubtful legal merit.").
All of the coworker participation clause cases cited by the Merritt court involved retaliation against
individuals who testified at administrative hearings or in court on behalf of those alleging discrimination.
See Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist.. 869 F.2d 1565, 1571-73 (5th Cir. 1989); Smith v.
Georgia, 684 F.2d 729, 730 (11 th Cir. 1982); Truelove v. Trustees of the Univ. of D.C., 744 F Supp. 307.
313 (D.D.C. 1990). In addition, all of the examples of protected "assistfancel" and "panticipatlionl" cited
in a major treatise on employment discrimination involve individuals in some way "allied with" the
aggrieved employee. BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN. E.MPLOYMENT DIScRIMINATION LAw 651-
52 (3d ed. 1996). Thus, it is far from clear that the Merritt court was correct to conclude that precedent
supported the protection of an employee whose participation was neither voluntary nor intended to assist
the complainant.
27. See McKenna v. Weinberger, 729 F.2d 783, 790 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (suggesting that the district
court erred in applying a balancing test to determine whether the plaintiffs participation in an investigation
of sex discrimination was protected activity); EEOC v. Pacific Press Publ'g Ass'n. 482 F Supp. 1291. 1308
(N.D. Cal. 1979) (noting that opposition conduct "must meet a balancing test," while participation activities
are "absolutely protected").
28. See Jackson v. St. Joseph State Hosp., 840 F.2d 1387. 1390 (8th Cir. 1987) (concluding that an
employee's actions in investigating his claim-including the harassment of a potential wtness-Awere not
reasonable and were too "bizarre" and disruptive to qualify for protection): EEOC v. Kallir, Philips. Ross,
Inc., 401 F. Supp. 66,71 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("Under some circumstances, an employee's conduct in gathering
or attempting to gather evidence to support his charge may be so excessive and so deliberately calculated
to inflict needless economic hardship on the employer that the employee loses .. protection ....").
29. See Hemandez v. Alexander, 607 F.2d 920, 924 (10th Cir. 1979) (balancing employee and
employer interests where the complaining employee spent a significant amount of his time at work
preparing Title VII complaints).
30. See Brown v. Ralston Purina Co., 557 F.2d 570, 572 (6th Cir. 1977) (noting that "an EEOC
complaint creates no right on the part of an employee to miss work, fail to perform assigned work, or leave
work without notice"); Blizard v. Fielding, 454 F. Supp. 318, 325-26 (D. Mass. 1978) (applying a balancing
test where the employee so avidly pursued her Title VII claims that she failed to do her job effectively).
aff'd sub nora. Blizard v. Frechette, 601 F.2d 1217 (Ist Cir. 1979).
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successful completion of the employee's assigned tasks.3t
A more explicit importation of a balancing test into participation cases
would be both appropriate and useful. This standard would not disrupt the
holdings in conventional cases, in which the employee's interest (vindicating
her own or another employee's Title VII claim) is strong and the employer's
interest in preventing such participation is weak. In cases like Merritt, on the
other hand, where the employee lacks a strong legitimate interest and the
employer has a significant countervailing interest related to the purposes of the
Act itself, a different outcome would result. Even if Dillard's president was
more upset by the hassle and expense Merritt had caused the company than by
his acts of harassment, 32 however, Dillard still had a legitimate interest in an
efficient and harmonious work environment. Although Merritt's testimony did
not itself undermine this interest, it did reveal to the company president that
Merritt had engaged in activities with such deleterious effects. A balancing test
would preserve existing protections for employees who participate willingly
and supportively in their colleagues' Title VII actions without including Merritt
and others like him in the protected class.
IV
The decision in Merritt impedes the creation of a workplace culture free
of harassment and discrimination. Under the Eleventh Circuit's doctrine,
employers do remain free to discipline or terminate harassers-so long as their
decisions are based on the harassment itself, not the testimony provided in
Title VII proceedings.33 In certain cases, however, the facts that emerge
during these hearings and trials may be the employer's primary source of
reliable information about the true course of events resulting in the complaint.
Merritt shortsightedly limits the flexibility of employers in such cases to
impose discipline on harassers. A more sophisticated and well-supported
approach to interpreting Title VII and precedent would have avoided this
result, which is largely incompatible with the goals of the statute.
-Brian J. Kreiswirth
31. This situation arises most frequently in cases involving equal employment opportunity (EEO)
officers. See Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714,726 (5th Cir. 1986) (balancing an EEO officer's interests
in filing a charge against the employer's interests in informal resolution of discrimination disputes); Smith
v. Singer Co., No. C-76-2367 RFP, 1979 WL 263, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 1979) (noting that "the filing
of charges, for which Smith [an EEO officer] seeks protection, must be evaluated in relation to his
prescribed duties and his particular responsibilities to his employer"), aff'd, 650 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1981).
32. According to Merritt, the company president told him: "Your deposition was the most damning
to Dillard's case, and you no longer have a place here .... Merritt, 120 F.3d at 1183. A balancing test
should consider the employer's demonstrated rationale for the adverse action, thus weighing less heavily
the interests of an employer motivated by anger or revenge than those of an employer more clearly driven
by a desire to address workplace discrimination.
33. See id. at 1188-89.
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Reducing Unjustified Sentencing Disparity
United States v. Meza, 127 .3d 545 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
1103 (1998).
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines' allow a judge to depart from the
Guideline sentence range in certain extraordinary cases. 2 Until recently, every
circuit to consider the issue had agreed that the departure authority does not
allow a judge to depart in order to remedy disparities in the sentences received
by codefendants in the same case. That is, even if application of the
Guidelines produced a much higher sentence for one defendant than for a
codefendant of seemingly identical culpability, the judge was not permitted to
depart--either by raising the low sentence, or by lowering the high
sentence-to equalize the two penalties.
In United States v. Meza,4 the Seventh Circuit reconsidered this position.
Applying the departure analysis developed by the Supreme Court in Koon v.
United States,5 the Seventh Circuit held that a district court now must inquire
whether the disparity is justified or unjustified. If it is unjustified, then the
court may depart to remedy the disparity. The Meza court did not discuss the
policy implications of its decision; it simply deduced the result from Koon.6
This Case Note argues that, from a policy perspective, Meza's approach
is a significant improvement over the current ban on disparity-based
departures. Widespread adoption of Meza not only would produce fairer
sentences in multidefendant cases, but also would have the larger virtue of
1. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1997).
2. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994) (permitting the sentencing court to depart if it finds -an aggravating
or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission").
3. See, e.g., United States v. Wogan, 938 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (Ist Cir. 1991); United States v. Joyner,
924 F.2d 454, 459-61 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Higgins, 967 F.2d 841. 845 (3d Cir. 1992); United
States v. Fonville, 5 F.3d 781, 783-84 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Ives, 984 .2d 649, 650 (5th Cir.
1993); United States v. Parker, 912 F.2d 156, 158 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Mejia, 953 F.2d 461.
467 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Garza, I F.3d 1098, 1100-01 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Chotas, 968 F.2d 1193, 1198 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Williams, 980 .2d 1463. 1467 (D.C. Cir.
1992). The Seventh and Eighth Circuits had not addressed directly the issue of whether sentencing disparity
is a proper basis for departure, but both had held that it is not an appropriate basis for resentencing. See
United States v. Edwards, 945 P.2d 1387, 1398 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Granados, 962 F.2d 767.
774 (8th Cir. 1992).
4. 127 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied. 118 S. Ct. 1103 (1998).
5. 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996).
6. See Meza, 127 F.3d at 549-50 (citing Koon, 116 S. Cr. at 2045. 2050-51. 2053).
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reintroducing explicit discussion of proportionality into the federal sentencing
process.
I
In March 1994, Antonio Meza was indicted for his role as middleman in
a marijuana trafficking conspiracy. Some ten months later, long after his
coconspirators had cooperated with the government, Meza pleaded guilty to a
single count of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute over 100
kilograms of marijuana.7 At the sentencing hearing, the district court
determined that the applicable Guideline range was forty-six to fifty-seven
months.8 Meza's lawyer then moved for the court to depart downward in order
to "equalize or regularize" Meza's sentence with those imposed on Meza's
coconspirators. 9 The district court denied the motion, stating that it had no
authority to depart on such a basis. The court then sentenced Meza to the
minimum term of forty-six months.'0
The Seventh Circuit initially upheld this decision and declined to revisit
the "well-settled rule that disparity among coconspirators' sentences does not
justify departure."" Its ruling was vacated and remanded by the Supreme
Court 2 for reconsideration in light of United States v. Koon,t3 in which the
Court had established an analytical framework for determining the
circumstances under which a district court may depart. Koon requires the
sentencing court to determine whether the sentencing factor relied upon for the
proposed departure is forbidden, encouraged, discouraged, or unmentioned in
the Guidelines. 4 If the factor is forbidden, then a court may not depart on
that basis.'5 If it is encouraged, then the court may depart to the extent that
the applicable Guideline does not already take it into account. 6 If it is
discouraged, then the court should depart only if the factor is present to such
7. Meza was charged under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846 (1994). See United States v. Meza, 76 F.3d 117,
119 (7th Cir.), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 478 (1996).
8. Meza's base offense level was 26, from which three points were deducted for his timely acceptance
of responsibility. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El .1 (1997). For an offender with little
or no criminal history, the resulting offense level of 23 corresponds to a prison sentence of 46 to 57
months. See id. § 5A.
9. Meza, 76 F.3d at 119. Neither of the two Meza opinions indicates the sentences received by Meza's
coconspirators, but apparently they received downward departures for providing substantial assistance to
the prosecutors. See Meza, 127 .3d at 550; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI.I
(allowing the district court to depart upon a motion by the prosecutor that the defendant provided
"substantial assistance" to authorities).
10. See Meza, 76 F.3d at 119.
11. ad at 122.
12. See Meza v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 478 (1996).
13. 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996) (evaluating the validity of downward departures granted to the four police
officers convicted of violating Rodney King's constitutional rights).
14. See id at 2045.
15. See id.
16. See id
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an extraordinary degree that it "makes the case different from the ordinary case
where the factor is present."'' 7 Finally, if the factor is unmentioned, then the
court must look to the "'structure and theory of both relevant individual
guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a whole""' to determine whether the
factor removes the case from the "heartland" of typical Guidelines cases. 9
Applying this analysis, the Seventh Circuit once again evaluated whether
the district court had the authority to depart in Meza's case. Although both
Meza and the government agreed that disparity in sentences among
coconspirators is a factor unmentioned in the Guidelines, the court rejected this
view. 0 Instead, the court distinguished between "justified" disparities, which
are mentioned-indeed required-by the Guidelines, and "unjustified"
disparities, which are unmentioned. 2' A justified disparity, the court held, is
one that the Sentencing Commission intentionally created, such as the disparity
that results when one defendant cooperates with authorities but the other does
not.22 Such a disparity can never be the basis for a departure because "it is
the application of the Guidelines that created the disparity in the first place. ' 23
An unjustified disparity, on the other hand, "is one that cannot be explained
by a comparison of each defendant against the Guidelines as a set of rules."2'
The court concluded that unjustified disparity is a potential basis for departure,
because "'the goal of the sentencing guidelines is, of course, to reduce
unjustified disparities.'2 5
17. Id.
18. Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942. 949 (lst Cir. 1993) (Breyer. J.)).
19. Id.
20. See Meza, 127 F.3d at 549 ("We reject both arguments because they stem from the erroneous
assumption that a disparity in sentences between co-conspirators .. is an unmentioned sentencing factor
in the Guidelines.").
21. Id. at 549-50.
22. See id at 549.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 550. The court also observed that an unjustified dispanty -does not result from a proper
application of the Guidelines." Id. Although this statement seems to imply that the question of whether a
particular disparity is justified or unjustified is simply a matter of whether the Guidelines were properly
applied, this cannot be the meaning of the court's distinction. Misapplication of the Guidelines is itself a
reversible error, for which the remedy would be not a departure from the Guideline sentence, but
resentencing in accordance with the Guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2) (1994) (providing for appellate
review of sentences "imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing gudelines'). Yet the
court made it clear that unjustified disparity may give nse to a departure by the trial judge: -For unjustified
disparities, the sentencing court should apply the three step process described (in Koon] to determine
whether a defendant merits a departure downward in his sentence ... . . eza. 127 F.3d at 550. This three-
step process involves: (1) determining whether anything about the case removes it from the "heartland" of
typical offenses; (2) assuring that the Sentencing Commission has not categorically proscribed consideration
of the factor, and (3) determining whether the factor is of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately considered
by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines. See id. at 549 (citing Koon. 116 S. C1. at
2045, 2051). Plainly, a district court would not need to engage in this process if unjustified disparity
amounted merely to an improperly calculated sentence. Implicitly, then, the court assumed that even a
technically correct application of the Guidelines can produce unjustifiably disparate sentences, in which ease
a departure would be necessary to address the problem.
25. Meza, 127 F.3d at 550 (quoting Koon. 116 S. Ct. at 2053): see also U.S. SEI'TNCNG GUIDELINES
MANUAL ch. I, pt. A, § 3 (1997) (identifying "'uniformity" as one of the goals of the Sentencing
Guidelines). The court found that the disparity between Meza's sentence and those of his coconspirators
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Ideally, a proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines would never
produce unjustifiably disparate sentences, and Meza's distinction between
justified and unjustified disparity would therefore be unnecessary. In practice,
however, it is impossible to design a set of mandatory guidelines that will
produce a fair sentence in every case, because the range of potential criminal
conduct is simply too great. Congress recognized as much when it established
the judge's departure authority in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.26 The
departure mechanism is premised on the notion that some cases inevitably will
fall outside the "heartland" of typical offenses to which the Guidelines are
meant to apply.27 In such cases, the judge must have some discretion to
impose a sentence above or below the normal Guideline range.
The question, then, is how generously to allocate this discretion. It is
essential to keep in mind the Guidelines' goals of honesty, uniformity, and
proportionality.28 If a judge can depart at will, then the goal of uniformity is
undermined. Conversely, if the judge's discretion is restricted too severely,
then proportionality will suffer, since the judge will be forced to treat
extraordinary cases the same as ordinary ones. The enforcement of an absolute
ban on departures based on disparity risks exalting uniformity at the cost of
proportionality. Unless one believes that application of the Guidelines never
results in unjustified disparity among codefendants, then it makes no sense to
impose an ex ante, categorical prohibition on disparity-based departures.
The problem of unjustified disparity is not illusory. Commentators have
identified numerous sources of disparity in Guidelines sentencing, such as
inconsistent charging practices,29 conflicting judicial interpretations of key
provisions,30  prosecutorial and judicial circumvention of the Guidelines,
was justified, because it resulted from the Guidelines provision for downward departures to reward
substantial assistance to the authorities. See Meza, 127 F.3d at 549.
26. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 3553(b), 98 Stat. 1987, 1989 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)).
27. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Ch. I, pt. A, § 4(b) ("The Commission intends the
sentencing courts to treat each guideline as carving out a 'heartland,' a set of typical cases embodying the
conduct that each guideline describes.").
28. See id. ch. 1, pt. A, § 3.
29. See, e.g., Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits
on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE. LJ. 1681, 1723-24 (1992) (observing that differing
prosecutorial practices are a source of hidden and unreviewable disparity); Eric Lotke, Sentencing Disparity
Among Co-Defendants: The Equalization Debate, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 116, 119 (1993) (discussing
the use of charge bargaining to elicit cooperation from defendants).
30. For example, courts apply conflicting definitions of the monetary "loss" that is the main
determinant of sentences for economic crimes such as fraud, larceny, and robbery. See Frank 0. Bowman
III, Back to Basics: Helping the Commission Solve the "Loss" Mess with Old Familiar Tools, 10 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 115, 116 (1997) (noting the existence of circuit splits on Ii distinct issues concerning
the definition and measurement of loss). See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, Loss ISSUES (1997)
(discussing circuit conflicts over the proper measurement of loss).
31. The problem of judicial and prosecutorial circumvention of the Guidelines has been documented
in an extensive empirical study by Ilene Nagel and Stephen Schulhofer. See Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J.
Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the
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an undue emphasis on drug and monetary quantities, 32 and pre-arrest sentence
manipulation by police officers and government investigators.33 Moreover,
judges appear to have grown frustrated by the Guidelines' inability to resolve
these problems. 34 Under these circumstances, there can be little doubt that the
problem of unwarranted disparity continues to persist in a substantial number
of cases. Thus, a blanket rule against departures to remedy this problem
appears, on its face, to be inappropriate.
Critics might respond that even though a blanket rule may preclude some
departures that are warranted, it is necessary because judges cannot be trusted
to identify these cases. This concern is overstated, for several reasons. First,
multidefendant cases are particularly well-suited for judgments about relative
culpability because all of the codefendants were involved in the same general
course of conduct. The judge therefore has a concrete frame of reference from
which to evaluate the culpability of each defendant.3 s Second, the Guidelines
themselves already acknowledge a judge's ability to differentiate between
levels of culpability in the same criminal enterprise.3 Thus, it is incongruous
to forbid judges from departing on this basis where such differences are
present to an extraordinary degree. Third, as the Supreme Court noted in Koon,
district court judges handle so many Guidelines cases that they have an
institutional advantage in determining whether a case is truly unusual or not.
37
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL L. REV. 501 (1992); Stephen J. Schulhofer & llenc H. Nagel.
Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months. 27 Am. CRim. L
REV. 231 (1989); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in tie Post-Mistretta Period. 91 Nw. U. L REV.
1284 (1997).
32. Critics point out that the Guidelines' overreliance on drug quantities sometimes produces blatantly
unjust results, such as identical sentences for a drug kingpin and his couriers. See. e.g., Albert W.
Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L REv. 901,
921 (1991) (arguing that the weight of drugs possessed is an unreliable indicator of culpability); Catherine
M. Goodwin, Sentencing Narcotics Cases Where Drug Amount Is a Poor Indicator of Relative Culpability.
4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 226 (1992) (arguing that the current drug guidelines contribute to unwarranted
sentencing disparity).
Similarly, monetary loss in economic crimes may be a poor proxy for culpability because the loss
figure does not adequately reflect either the amount of harm caused by the crime or the defendant's state
of mind. See, e.g., Russell M. Coombs, Perfecting a Blunder: Redefining Loss as the Main Gauge of
Federal Sentences for Theft and Fraud, 10 FED. SENTENCING REP. 152. 153-54 (1997). These inherent
limitations on the "loss" concept are exacerbated by inconsistent application by courts. See supra note 30.
33. See Jeffrey L. Fisher, Note. When Discretion Leads to Distortion: Recognizing Pre.Arrest
Sentence-Manipulation Claims Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 94 MICii. L REV. 2385.2396-97
(1996) (describing methods by which government agents manipulate quantity-based drug sentences).
34. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINEs: RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER'S 1996 SURVEY 117 (1997) (showing that 72.8% of district court judges and 68.8% of
appellate court judges favor abolishing the current system of mandatory guidelines).
35. See Lotke, supra note 29, at 118 ("Many traditional difficulties of defining fairness and
proportionality disappear in codefendant cases. It is relatively easy to compare the culpability of people
engaged in the same enterprise.").
36. Indeed, the Guidelines instruct the judge to adjust the offense level to reflect this factor, although
the adjustment is too small to eliminate the disparity problem in every case. See U.S. SENrENcING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B.LI to .2 (1997) (providing for adjustments to the offense level based on the
defendant's role in the offense).
37. See Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035. 2047 (1996).
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Finally, the decision to depart would, as always, be subject to appellate review,
thus mitigating the danger that judges would depart too aggressively.39
Meza provides a sensible measure of discretion for judges to depart when
unjustified disparity arises in its most recognizable context: multidefendant
cases. It has the additional virtue of inducing judges to engage in explicit
consideration of proportionality as a sentencing objective. In order to avoid
appellate reversal, a judge must state on the record her reasons for departing;
in the Meza situation, the judge would have to explain why a particular
defendant is more or less culpable than his codefendants. The appellate court,
in turn, would have occasion to comment publicly on the district court's
rationale for departing. Such exchanges could help transform the sentencing of
multiple defendants from a mechanical computation of offense levels into a
rational consideration of each codefendant's culpability. Moreover, in a system
marked increasingly by prosecutorial and judicial circumvention of the
Guidelines,39 the availability of a departure to address unjustified disparity
among codefendants would lessen the need to engage in Guideline
manipulation. These systemic benefits are lost whenever district courts are
categorically forbidden from considering a sentencing factor as a possible
ground for departure.
III
Permitting judges to depart on the basis of unjustified disparity among
codefendants could have salutary consequences beyond improving the fairness
of the sentences at hand. It could lead to a richer and more honest discussion
of the underlying purposes of sentences and how they are-or are not-served
by the current structure of the Guidelines. Ultimately, the causes of unjustified
sentencing disparity are best addressed through revision of the Guidelines
themselves.40 In the meantime, though, departures can reduce such disparity
and draw attention to the areas of the Guidelines that judges find especially
problematic. Meza encourages judges to inquire into the causes of disparity,
rather than simply declare the issue off-limits. Adoption of Meza's approach
by other circuits would represent an encouraging first step toward restoring
thoughtfulness and discretion to federal sentencing.
-James A. McLaughlin
38. A district court's decision to depart is reviewable under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See id.
at 2050. The decision not to depart is unreviewable, unless it is based on the judge's erroneous belief that
he lacks authority to depart in that case. See, e.g., United States v. Sammoury, 74 F3d 1341, 1343 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (noting that "[o]n this point, the courts of appeals are unanimous"). This asymmetry provides
additional incentive for judges to depart only in truly extraordinary cases.
39. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
40. The Sentencing Commission is responsible for reviewing the operation of the Guidelines and
submitting proposed amendments to Congress. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(o)-(p) (1994).
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